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“Your corn is ripe to-day; mine will be so to-morrow.  ‘Tis profitable for us
both, that I shou’d labour with you to-day, and that you shou’d aid me to-
morrow.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
There is little debate that the landscape of food production has
changed rapidly since the advent of biotechnology2 directed at agricul-
tural innovation.  As of 2011, the United States remains the global
leader in the production of biotech crops holding the largest acreage—
at over one hundred seventy million acres—and variety of commer-
cialized crops, including maize, soybeans, cotton, canola, sugar beet,
alfalfa, papaya, and squash.3  In this current age of rapidly developing
technology for the sake of engineering super crops possessed of only
the most desirable traits, farmers who choose not to utilize these
methodologies may be unwittingly forced to do so as nature provides
the transport enabling these genetically altered microorganisms to
find their way onto their growing fields.  Concerns over genetically en-
gineered (GE)4 foods have recently received increasing attention in
1. DAVID HUME, 3 A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 520 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1896).
2. Hungarian engineer Karl Ereky developed this term in 1919, referring to “the
science and the methods that permit products to be produced from raw materials
with the aid of living organisms.” ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC POLICY AND DE-
VELOPMENT, MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE OECD 1 (1999) available at http://
www.oecd.org/science/biotechnologypolicies/1890904.pdf.  “Modern biotechnol-
ogy” began when James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the structure of
DNA and produced their double helix model in 1953. Id.
3. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2011, Slides and Tables,
INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, http://www.
isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/43/pptslides/default.asp (last visited Oct.
21, 2012).  Notably, Brazil comes in second with less than half the amount of land
at 30.3 hectares and only three types of crops. Id. While only the eight crops
listed above are currently planted, “[o]ther crops approved for commercialization
have included varieties of potatoes, radicchio, rapeseed, rice, squash, sugar beets,
tobacco, and tomatoes.  However, these are either not commercialized or not
widely planted.” SUSAN A. SCHNEIDER, FOOD, FARMING AND SUSTAINABILITY:
READINGS IN AGRICULTURAL LAW 538 (2011).
4. Genetic engineering is the process of “[m]anipulation of an organism’s genes by
introducing, eliminating or rearranging specific genes using the methods of mod-
ern molecular biology, particularly those techniques referred to as recombinant
DNA techniques.” Glossary of Agricultural Biotechnology Terms, USDA, http://
www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=BiotechnologyGlosary.xml
&navid=AGRICULTURE (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).  The term “genetic engi-
neering” is often used synonymously with the term “genetic modification” even
though the two terms are not identical.  “Genetic modification” is defined as “[t]he
production of heritable improvements in plants or animals for specific uses, via
either genetic engineering or other more traditional methods.  Some countries
other than the United States use this term to refer specifically to genetic engi-
neering.” Id.  The term genetic modification includes “more traditional methods”
such as hybridization or cross breeding, id., which do not involve the insertion of
foreign genetic material whereas the term genetic engineering does not.
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mainstream media.  Advocacy groups struggle to make their voices
heard to the federal agencies charged with ensuring the safety of our
nation’s food supply over the din of arguments by industry that such
innovation is crucial to our nation’s survival, economically and other-
wise.5  Yet, the disputes between farmers over how best to protect
their crops receive far less attention.
Inevitable conflict over crop contamination due to pollen drift pits
farmer against farmer as organic and non-GE farmers struggle to en-
sure the health and economic safety of their products.  Simultane-
ously, the demand for increased access to, and support for, organic and
non-GE foods is steadily increasing.6  The non-GE category of foods is
reported to be the fastest growing sector “in the natural and organic
food industry.”7  Moreover, according to the most recent report re-
leased by the White House addressing the state of the agricultural
economy, the U.S. organic industry “grew to $31.4 billion in 2011, up
from $21.1 billion in 2008 [and t]he number of operations certified or-
ganic grew by 1,109—or more than 6%—between 2009 and 2011.”8
5. See, e.g., Cheryl Morley, The Changing Landscape of American Agriculture, MON-
SANTO (Jan. 8, 2007), http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/Changing-
Landscape-American-Agriculture.aspx (“I think the changing landscape of U.S.
agriculture requires a profound shift in agricultural relationships among all par-
ticipants in the value chain from growers to retailers.  We’ll have to evolve and
figure out the way that these commodities are grown, handled, and
used . . . Redefining our working relationships . . . how we work together to de-
velop new markets and food platforms to meet the new and renewable sources of
energy and consumer food demands.  This requires change.  Not only biotechnol-
ogy, molecular breeding, but it will require new infrastructure data-gathering
technology partnerships.  At this stage I will tell you the magnitude seems pretty
overwhelming, almost impossible, but it’s already happening today at various
stages.  Change brings discomfort, but it also brings great opportunity.”); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-60, GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS:
AGENCIES ARE PROPOSING CHANGES TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT, BUT COULD TAKE AD-
DITIONAL STEPS TO IMPROVE COORDINATION AND MONITORING (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/283060.pdf (“Proponents cite the potential for en-
hanced crop yields; more environmentally friendly food production; more nutri-
tious foods; and the increased use of plants to inexpensively produce
pharmaceutical compounds, such as human or veterinary drugs, or industrial
compounds, such as substances used in paper production or detergent
manufacturing.”).
6. Ken Roseboro, Non-GMO is Fastest Growing Natural Food Category, THE OR-
GANIC AND NON-GMO REPORT (May 1, 2011), http://www.non-gmoreport.com/arti-
cles/may2011/nonGMOgrowingnaturalfoodcategory.php (“According to natural
food market research firm SPINS, Non-GMO Project verified product sales grew
27% over the past year, making it the fastest growing segment in the natural and
organic food industry.”).
7. Id.
8. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, WHITE HOUSE RURAL COUNCIL, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, STRENGTHENING RURAL COMMUNITIES: LESSONS
FROM A GROWING FARM ECONOMY 3 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/docs/rural_communities_06_11_2012.pdf.
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Such marked growth led the Administration to conclude that the U.S.
agricultural economy will only benefit by growth and support of this
sector.9
The notable growth in these sectors demonstrates clear evidence of
the strong consumer demand for “natural” products.  Polls conducted
by various research organizations and media outlets show that over
ninety percent of respondents believe strongly that they are entitled to
information about the foods they eat and want GE foods to be la-
beled.10  Consequently, countless individuals are entering the debate
over GE foods by signing petitions demanding that industry “just la-
bel”11 products containing GE ingredients and encouraging individu-
als to shop for non-GE verified foods.12
In the midst of this battle and despite farmers’ efforts to protect
their crops, the federal government continues to make decisions that
operate to threaten meaningful coexistence between farmers.  Consist-
ently, the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service (the APHIS) has taken the posi-
tion that because its authority is limited to regulating plant pests
under the Plant Protection Act (PPA),13 once it has determined that a
9. Id.
10. Polls on GMO Labeling, Ctr. for Food Safety, http://gefoodlabels.org/gmo%20la-
beling/polls-on-gmo-labeling/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2012) (including the following
statistics in the three most recent polls: (1) MSNBC: “ ‘Do you believe genetically
modified foods should be labeled?’ Answer: Yes[—]96% of over 45,000 voters be-
lieve genetically modified foods should be labeled”; (2) Reuters/NPR: “Poll con-
ducted by Thompson Reuters and National Public Radio finds 93% of Americans
believe all GE foods should be labeled as such; only 35% willing to eat GE fish;”
and (3) Washington Post: “Question: Should genetically-modified food be labeled?
Answer: Yes[—]95%”).  Additionally, “[a]wareness of genetically engineered foods
increased as income and education levels increased.  Only 51% of respondents
who earn less than $25,000 said they were aware of genetically engineered
foods—compared with 84% of those who earn over $100,000.  Older respondents
are the most willing to eat genetically engineered food.  Only 32% of respondents
ages 35–64 said they would eat altered fish, compared to 43% of those 65 and
over.” THOMAS REUTERS, NATIONAL SURVEY OF HEALTHCARE CONSUMERS: GENETI-
CALLY ENGINEERED FOOD 3 (2010), available at http://www.factsforhealthcare.
com/pressroom/NPR_report_GeneticEngineeredFood.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Tell FDA to Label Genetically Engineered Food, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY,
http://salsa3.salsalabs.com/o/1881/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=5452 (last
visited Oct. 26, 2012); Tell the FDA We Have a Right to Know if Our Food Has
Been Genetically Modified, JUST LABEL IT, http://justlabelit.org/take-action/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2012).
12. Creating Change Through Action, NON-GMO PROJECT, http://www.nongmopro-
ject.org/take-action/consumers/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2012) (detailing an advocacy
project directed at giving consumers access to information about genetically engi-
neered/modified foods).
13. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 (2006).  Under the PPA, “[t]he term
‘plant pest’ means any living stage of any of the following that can directly or
indirectly injure, cause damage to, or cause disease in any plant or plant product:
(A) A protozoan.
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GE crop does not present a plant pest risk, the agency’s only function
is to grant nonregulated status and provide no further safeguards as
the product enters the commercial market and becomes distributed
and planted without restrictions.14  APHIS’s recent decisions demon-
strate that the agency at least recognizes the potential for significant
negative impacts to organic and non-GE farmers upon deregulation,
yet suggests these are issues that must be worked out among farm-
ers.15  This position places organic and non-GE farmers in an incredi-
bly weak position given that their GE counterparts have already
received the necessary approval to plant crops without any additional
requirements or further oversight from the USDA.  In other words,
these policy decisions have the practical effect of curtailing any moti-
vation on the part of GE farmers to collaborate with organic and non-
GE farmers when it means they will be required to take additional
steps or provide safety mechanisms that have not been imposed on
them by the responsible regulating authorities.
Recently, it appears the agency has started to recognize the ineq-
uity in such an approach and tasked the USDA Advisory Committee
on Biotechnology and the 21st Century (AC21), originally created in
2003, to determine, among other things, an appropriate means by
which farmers who have suffered injuries as a result of crop contami-
nation can be remunerated.16  In addition to considering the issue of
(B) A nonhuman animal.
(C) A parasitic plant.
(D) A bacterium.
(E) A fungus.
(F) A virus or viroid.
(G) An infectious agent or other pathogen.”
(H) Any article similar to or allied with any of the articles specified in the
preceding subparagraphs.”
Id. § 702(14).
14. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About Biotechnology, U.S.D.A., http://www.
usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=BiotechnologyFAQs.xml&navid=
AGRICULTURE (last visited Dec. 5, 2012) (“The regulations also provide for a
petition process for the determination of non-regulated status.  Once a determi-
nation of non-regulated status has been made, the organism (and its offspring) no
longer requires APHIS review for movement or release in the U.S.”); Guidance on
Petitions for Extension of Nonregulated Status, U.S.D.A., http://www.aphis.usda.
gov/biotechnology/extensions.shtml (last visited Dec. 5, 2012) (“If APHIS deter-
mines that the regulated article does not present a risk of introduction or dissem-
ination of a plant pest, the petition will be granted, thereby allowing unrestricted
introduction of the article.”).
15. USDA, Draft Environmental Assessment, Dow AgroScience (DAS)’s Petition for
Nonregulated Status of Herbicide Tolerant DAS-40278-9 Corn, Event DAS-
40278-9, 22–24 (Oct. 2011), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/09_23301p_
dea.pdf.
16. The USDA established the AC21 in accordance with the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Act.  5 U.S.C. App. 2 §§ 1–16 (2006).  In the Charter, one of the express
duties of the Committee is to “provide information and advice to the Secretary of
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remuneration, USDA Secretary Vilsack charged the AC21 to reach a
decision by consensus on the ways to “bolster coexistence among dif-
ferent agricultural production systems”17 and mitigate risk so that
neighbors are not suing neighbors, and farmers are not forced to re-
solve their disputes in court.18  Such a federal initiative is necessary
since federal laws have not kept pace with advancing technologies
and, while some states have attempted to address the issue of patent
violations to ensure that farmers whose crops are contaminated
through no fault of their own are shielded from liability,19 no state has
created legislation that permits farmers to recover when their crops
have been contaminated.
This Article argues that because current federal policies hamper
the ability of organic and non-GE farmers to ensure the safety and
authenticity of their products, the AC21 needs to meet its charge and
reach consensus on USDA supported mechanisms that encourage and
facilitate farmers to develop long term, viable solutions that address
the interests of all parties.  Without USDA support, farmers have lit-
tle incentive to attempt collaboration under the umbrella of existing
federal policies.  Part II of this Article provides a detailed history of
the regulatory scheme that governs genetically engineered plants and
products and demonstrates the clear preference for the development
and support of GE products.  In Part III, this Article examines the
scope of authority granted to the USDA under the Plant Protection
Act to regulate genetically engineered organisms.  Part IV addresses
the issue of gene flow from GE crops to non-GE and organic crops, and
provides a discussion of the cases that have brought this issue before
the courts.  Finally, Part V of this article concludes by analyzing the
Agriculture on topics related to the use of biotechnology in agriculture.  The com-
mittee is charged with examining the long-term impacts of biotechnology on the
U.S. food and agriculture system and USDA, and providing guidance to USDA on
pressing individual issues, identified by the Office of the Secretary, related to the
application of biotechnology in agriculture.” USDA, ADVISORY COMM. ON BI-
OTECHN. & 21ST CENTURY AGRIC. (AC21), CHARTER 2 (2003), available at http://
www.usda.gov/documents/AC21%20Charter%202011.pdf.
17. The AC21 has defined coexistence as referring “to the concurrent cultivation of
conventional, organic, and genetically engineered crops consistent with underly-
ing consumer preferences and farmer choices.”  USDA ADVISORY COMM. ON BI-
OTECH. & 21ST CENTURY AGRI. (AC21), MTG. TRANSCRIPT, MAY 29, 2012, at
12:24–13:2 (2012), available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?
contentid=AC21Main.xml&contentidonly=true.
18. Id.
19. See CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 52305 (West 2012) (“A farmer shall not be liable based on
the presence or possession of a patented genetically engineered plant on real
property owned or occupied by the farmer when the farmer did not knowingly buy
or otherwise knowingly acquire the genetically engineered plant, the farmer ac-
ted in good faith and without knowledge of the genetically engineered nature of
the plant, and when the genetically engineered plant is detected at a de minimis
level.”).
2013] FORGING TOWARD COEXISTENCE 773
work of the AC21 and arguing that the working group needs to con-
sider the implementation of collaborative mechanisms to aid farmers
in achieving some degree of coexistence.
II. REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS
A. Creation of the Coordinated Framework for the
Regulation of Biotechnology
1. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Biotechnology
Operating from the position that “new techniques for manipulating
genetic information offer exciting advances, as remarkable as the dis-
covery of antibiotics or the computer chip,”20 the federal government
drafted a  “Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Biotechnol-
ogy”21 to address health and safety concerns about what were then
newly developed fields of biotechnology, collectively known as genetic
engineering, while simultaneously attempting to foster growth of a
relatively new and seemingly promising sector.22  According to Al
Gore, the Investigations Subcommittee in the House of Representa-
tives, which he chaired, determined the “absence of good risk assess-
ment practices and methods” made it virtually impossible for the
government to determine the safety of these products.23  Conse-
quently, the Subcommittee recommended the government coordinate
its regulatory efforts and develop a scheme that properly addressed
the needs of this industry.24
The government drafted its first iteration of this proposal in 198425
following the recognition by the White House Cabinet Council on Nat-
ural Resources and the Environment,26 also known as the interagency
working group, that federal agencies needed a mechanism by which
20. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856
(Dec. 31, 1984).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 50,857 (“The Working Group recognizes the need for a coordinated and
sensible regulatory review process that will minimize the uncertainties and inef-
ficiencies that can stifle innovation and impair the competitiveness of U.S.
industry.”).
23. Al Gore, Planning a New Biotechnology Policy, 5 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 19, 22
(1991).
24. Id.
25. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,856.
26. “The member agencies included the Departments of Justice, State, Agriculture,
Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Inte-
rior, EPA; the Council on Environmental Quality, the Council of Economic Advi-
sors; OMB; the Office of Policy Development; the National Science Foundation;
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representatives; and OSTP.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, RCED-92-167, BIOTECHNOLOGY: DELAYS IN AND STATUS OF EPA’S EF-
FORTS TO ISSUE A TSCA REGULATION, 3 n.1 (1992), available at http://www.gao.
gov/assets/220/216370.pdf.
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they could share scientific information to “adequately consider[ ]
health and environmental safety consequences of the processes of the
new biotechnology as they move[d] from the research laboratory to the
marketplace.”27  By adopting such an approach, the Administration
explicitly rejected the idea of creating a “superagency” that would pro-
vide oversight within a single agency.28
In the 1984 proposal, the working group acknowledged that con-
cerns about recombinant DNA (rDNA) research had existed in the sci-
entific community since the early 1970s,29 although attempts at
regulation in this field proceeded without any meaningful comprehen-
sive review of the regulatory requirements pertaining thereto.30
Therefore, the working group proposed a coordinated agency regula-
tory scheme wherein the responsible agencies, the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
the USDA would approach regulation of these new products of genetic
engineering under an existing statutory regime while developing indi-
vidual statements of policy that would detail their regulatory
approaches.31
Specifically, the working group acknowledged that the FDA in-
tended to regulate genetically engineered products in the same man-
ner as their non-genetically engineered counterparts under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).32  It charged the EPA
with both determining whether these products constitute pesticides or
industrial products under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act (FIFRA),33 and either designating acceptable levels of
27. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework, 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,857–58.  The Proposal
noted specifically that the interagency working group “recognize[d] that not only
should approaches be consistent from agency to agency and within each agency
from application to application, but also that regulatory decisions should be
based upon the best available science.” Id. (emphasis added).
28. Gore, supra note 23, at 22.
29. Christine C. Vito, State Biotechnology Oversight: The Juncture of Technology,
Law and Public Policy, 45 ME. L. REV. 329, 332 (1993) (“In the summer of 1973,
nearly 100 scientists at the Gordon Conference on Nucleic Acids in New Hamp-
shire expressed a collective concern as to the safety and potential risks associated
with the recombinant DNA experiments presented at the Conference.”).  These
scientists then asked for assistance and recommendations from both the National
Institutes of Health and the National Academy of Sciences. Id.
30. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,857.
31. Id. at 50,858.
32. Id.; Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2006); While not
explicitly stated in either version of the Framework, this approach was consistent
with the FDA’s interpretation of their statutory authority under the FDCA. See
Statement of Policy, Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
22,984 (May 29, 1992).
33. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,858;
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, & Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a); 40 C.F.R.
3.150–89 (2011).
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pesticide residue in food or animal feed products or establishing ex-
emptions from these limits under the FDCA.34  Finally, it required the
USDA to determine whether products containing genetically engi-
neered microorganisms were “plant pests, animals biological, or other
agricultural products” subject to regulation within their authority
under the PPA.35  In other words, the working group assigned agen-
cies to regulate the products of biotechnology under the existing statu-
tory framework that pertained to food, pesticides, and plants rather
than under any new laws specifically targeted to address this field.36
One of the early responses to the concerns raised in the 1970s by
the scientific community was the creation of the National Institutes of
Health’s Recombinant (NIH) DNA Advisory Committee,37 which de-
veloped “Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules” to “specify practices for constructing and handling” rDNA
molecules, as well as the organisms containing them.38  In these early
stages, the government’s approach seemed precautionary or at least it
attempted to give the appearance that this was its methodology.39  To
that end, the original proposed policy emphasized that “[t]he impor-
tance of the highest caliber scientific advice to the decision-making
process for oversight of biotechnology is undisputed.”40  Specifically,
34. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 342(a)(2)(B), 346a(a)(1)–(2), (b)(2)(A)(i).
35. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework, 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,858; Plant Protection
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701–7721 (2006).
36. Id.; see also Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Reg-
ulating Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 393, 407
(2007) (“The Coordinated Framework fits the products of genetic engineering into
an already-existing set of laws and regulations.  Because these laws were drafted
before the development of this technology, they are not always well suited to their
new tasks.”).
37. About Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC), NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH,
http://oba.od.nih.gov/rdna_rac/rac_about.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2012); see also
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHARTER, RECOMBINANT DNA AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE (2011) (“The Committee makes recommendations on research
involving the use of recombinant DNA and on developments in recombinant DNA
technology.”).
38. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLV-
ING RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES (2011), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/
rac/guidelines/nih_guidelines.htm.  These Guidelines have been revised many
times since their initial drafting in 1976. Id.  To reflect the concept of a coordi-
nated agency effort at regulation, the guidelines specify that “[a]ny recombinant
DNA experiment, which according to NIH Guidelines requires approval by NIH,
must be submitted to NIH or to another Federal agency that has jurisdiction for
review and approval.” Id.  However, once approval is received from another Fed-
eral agency, “the experiment may proceed without the necessity for NIH review of
approval.” Id.
39. D.L. Uchtmann, Starlink—A Case Study of Agricultural Biotechnology Regula-
tion, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159, 165 (2002) (“These initial guidelines represented a
cautious approach to the regulation of rDNA research but they did allow such
research to continue.”).
40. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework, 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,858 (emphasis added).
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“[t]he experience of the [Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee] over
the past ten years serves as a valuable model to the Working Group in
structuring the proposed scientific review coordinating mechanism.”41
However, because the original NIH Guidelines applied solely to activi-
ties that either took place at, or were sponsored by, the NIH, private
parties were essentially permitted to conduct unrestricted research of
their own.42
While these early attempts at assurances that agency decisions
would be informed by the best available science may have assuaged
the worries of some, they ultimately yielded a regulatory scheme that
provides little substantive federal oversight in a field in desperate
need.  The government intentionally left a fair amount of ambiguity in
the 1984 proposal to allow the different agencies flexibility in their
regulatory approach; but, perhaps the unintended effect was a great
deal of confusion over any activities that fell outside the NIH
Guidelines.43
2. The 1986 Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of
Biotechnology
In the wake of the confusion and unrest generated by the 1984 Pro-
posal for a Coordinated Framework, the Office of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy (OSTP) again convened to create the Biotechnology Science
Coordinating Committee (BSCC).44  Specifically, the OSTP proposed
the BSCC to cure the deficiencies in the two-tiered approach sug-
gested under the 1984 proposal.45  Under that approach, the first tier,
comprised of “research sponsoring” agencies and the regulatory agen-
cies (FDA, USDA, and EPA) would use science advisory committees to
provide advice on “scientific questions raised by applications seeking
approval for scientific research or for product testing or marketing.”46
The second tier was to act as a parent advisory board that would help
facilitate “interagency review and coordination.”47
After careful consideration and review of the comments received in
response to the 1984 Proposal for a Coordinated Framework, the
OSTP determined that any application had the potential to be of inter-
est to multiple agencies and, given the rapid pace of development in
41. Id.
42. Vito, supra note 29, at 333 (citing NIH Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (July 7,
1976); Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 48 Fed.
Reg. 24,556, 24,563 (Jun. 1, 1983)).
43. Id. at 335.
44. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework, 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,858.
45. Id.
46. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology; Establishment of the
Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174–75 (Nov. 8,
1985).
47. Id.
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this sector, such a two-tiered approach was insufficient to tackle the
unique challenges posed by these decisions.48  Consequently, it pro-
posed an “interagency coordinating committee” with representatives
from each of the involved agencies “to coordinate science issues re-
lated to research and commercial applications of biotechnology . . . .”49
Importantly, the BSCC was charged only with coordinating scientific
information between the agencies and was not intended to focus on or
address any issues related to the problems surrounding regulatory
oversight.  Despite this mandate, the BSCC was criticized for the fact
that it became involved in issues of regulatory policy rather than sci-
ence, conducted much of its business outside of the discerning eyes of
the public, and ultimately failed to meet its obligation of establishing
standards to guide agency decision making in this regard.50  Eventu-
ally, the BSCC enlisted the National Research Council of the National
Academies of Science to “evaluate scientific information pertinent to
making decisions about the introduction of genetically modified orga-
nisms and microorganisms into the environment.”51
With the help of the BSCC,52 in 1986, the OSTP published its re-
vised Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology.53
This second attempt at developing a coordinated agency response to
biotechnology outlined the regulatory framework that currently re-
mains largely unchanged and was premised on the same notion as its
predecessor—that “[r]ecombinant DNA techniques have opened up
new and promising possibilities in a wide range of applications and
can be expected to bring considerable benefits to mankind.”54  As sug-
gested in the 1984 proposed policy, the Coordinated Framework deter-
mined that the creation of new laws to regulate the products of genetic
48. Id.
49. Id. at 47,176.  The express purposes of the BSCC were to “[s]erve as a coordinat-
ing forum for addressing scientific problems, sharing information, and developing
consensus; promote consistency in the development of Federal agencies’ review
procedures and assessments; facilitate continuing cooperation among Federal
agencies on emerging scientific issues; and identify gaps in scientific knowledge.”
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 176 (1991).
50. Gore, supra note 23, at 22; Linda Maher, The Environment and the Domestic Reg-
ulatory Framework for Biotechnology, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 133, 140 (1993)
(citing BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES BIOTECHNOLOGY: A LEGIS-
LATIVE & REGULATORY ROADMAP, BNA SPECIAL REPORT ON BIOTECHNOLOGY # 2, at
7 (1989)) (explaining the emphasis on policy may have been due, in part, to sev-
eral Bush appointees to the Committee who were lawyers rather scientists).
51. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGA-
NISMS: A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONS 1 (1989).
52. Maher, supra note 50, at 140 (noting the original chairman of the BSCC, David
Kingsbury, helped to draft the Coordinated Framework).
53. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302
(June 26, 1986).
54. Id. at 23,308.
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engineering was unnecessary, as “[t]he existing health and safety laws
had the advantage that they could provide more immediate regulatory
protection and certainty for the industry than possible with the imple-
mentation of new legislation.”55  Moreover, the OSTP did not feel that
any alternative approach was viable given the broad range of prod-
ucts, of which the regulatory responsibility is vested in different agen-
cies.56  Its focus was, and remains, on the end product rather than the
process.  Overall, the revised proposal left much of the substance of
the 1984 draft in place; but, it also included “certain refinements” such
as the BSCC’s definitions of “intergenic (new) organism” and “patho-
gen”57 and outlined some additional specifics regarding the regulatory
landscape.
Notably, the OSTP specified that it intended the Coordinated
Framework to provide guidance on those decisions that required regu-
latory approval and review and those that did not.58  For example, the
OSTP referred to the fact that, within agriculture, new plants, ani-
mals, and microorganisms have long been introduced without federal
regulation, and only some of those that are non-native or pathogenic
would now require federal oversight.59  However, this oversimplifica-
tion ignores the fact that those introductions took place through con-
ventional breeding techniques rather than by genetic engineering.
Additionally, by the time of publication of this version of the Coordi-
nated Framework, the NIH Guidelines, which were intended to pro-
vide assurances to the scientific community, had been meaningfully
relaxed.60  Consequently, the OSTP noted that not all experiments in-
volving the environmental release of genetically engineered organisms
55. Id. at 23,303.
56. Id.; Maher, supra note 50, at 138 (“Biotechnology is a multi-discipline science,
and at times, its products cross traditional barriers that distinguish foods from
pesticides, medicines from poisons, and even tomatoes from fish.”).
57. Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at
23,302, 23,307.
58. Id. at 23,302.
59. Id. (“Within agriculture, for example, introductions of new plants, animals and
microorganisms have long occurred routinely with only some of those that are not
native or are pathogenic requiring regulatory approval.  It should be noted that
microorganisms play many essential and varied roles in agriculture and the envi-
ronment and that for decades agricultural scientists have endeavored to exploit
their advantages through routine experimentation and introduction into the en-
vironment; and as a rule these agricultural and environmental introductions
have taken place without harm to the environment.”).
60. Id. at 23,305 (“Since [their adoption,] the guidelines have been modified many
times with gradual relaxation of these requirements.”); Uchtmann, supra note 39,
at 165 (citing Susan Wright, The Status of Hazards and Controls, 24 ENVIRON-
MENT 13 (1982)) (“Over time, the experience gained in rDNA laboratories miti-
gated many of the concerns associated with rDNA research, at least in the minds
of many scientists, and led to a modest relaxing of the initial guidelines and over-
sight mechanisms.”).
2013] FORGING TOWARD COEXISTENCE 779
would be subject to prior approval.61  This was especially true for
plant applications since those presented low risk.62
Commenting on the agencies’ individual statements of policy, the
OSTP appeared to reiterate that each responsible agency needed to
conduct its assessments on a “case by case basis” while considering
“the ultimate safety of the product as a primary concern,” but also tak-
ing into account “other issues, such as efficacy.”63  Interestingly, the
OSTP’s choice of language in this document reflected its clear position
that the products of genetic engineering were not only identical to
their non-genetically engineered counterparts, but also had the poten-
tial to be superior.64  The policy was driven by two major premises,
which were alluded to, although not specifically stated.  First, the
techniques used in genetic engineering are not necessarily any less
safe than the traditional methods of genetic modification through
breeding or hybridization.65  Second, these new products of genetic en-
gineering were not necessarily fundamentally different from their nat-
ural counterparts.66  While some might suggest that such flexibility
was necessary to ensure the growth of this sector, concerns that the
“ultimate safety” of these products has become relegated to “other is-
sues” abound.
Not surprisingly, given the contentious nature of all things related
to genetic engineering and biotechnology, the Coordinated Framework
was not without its controversy.  Just a few months after the notice for
comments was issued in the Federal Register, the District Court for
the District of Columbia handed down its decision in Foundation on
Economic Trends v. Johnson.67  The plaintiffs, including a non-profit
organization in Washington D.C., that were “concerned . . . with the
various implications of certain technological developments involving
61. Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at
23,305.
62. Id.
63. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework, 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,858.
64. “While the recently developed methods are an extension of traditional manipula-
tions that can produce similar or identical products, they enable more precise
genetic modifications, and therefore hold the promise for exciting innovation and
new areas of commercial opportunity.”  Coordinated Framework for the Regula-
tion of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986).
65. Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
349, 377 (2007) (citing Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology,
51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302–03); cf. Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regula-
tory Policy on Genetically Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733,
738 (2003) (“Undergirding the Coordinated Framework—and the determination
that biotechnology could be addressed under existing statutes and regulations—
were two critical assumptions: first, that the techniques of biotechnology are not
riskier than traditional breeding techniques; and second, that GMOs are not fun-
damentally different from other organisms.”).
66. Id.
67. 661 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1986).
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biochemical and genetic engineering,” sought a declaratory judgment
to enjoin the operation of the Coordinated Framework on the basis
that the BSCC’s biotechnological definitions included in the Coordi-
nated Framework were inaccurate and inexact.68  Such inaccuracy,
the plaintiffs argued, would allow for potentially harmful genetically-
engineered products to be either incorrectly or far too leniently regu-
lated, which would fail to protect the health and safety of the natural
and human environments.69  Because these definitions had the poten-
tial to have such serious impact and would either affect future regula-
tions or be incorporated into already existing regulations, the
plaintiffs claimed the Coordinated Framework was “defective for lack
of notice or hearing, . . . and in any case constitutes irrational agency
action.”70
The plaintiffs in Foundation on Economic Trends were ultimately
unsuccessful because of their failure to demonstrate both that the Co-
ordinated Framework constituted an agency action subject to judicial
review and that they had suffered any harm as a result of it;71 how-
ever, the court’s perspective on the significance of the Coordinated
Framework provided interesting insight regarding the manner in
which the agencies charged with regulating biotechnology were in-
tended to interpret it.  The court noted that the document was not in-
tended to regulate, but rather was meant to “guide policymaking.”72
The manner in which the responsible agencies have chosen to effectu-
ate those policy directives has been the source of considerable debate
in the realm of genetic engineering, particularly since they have es-
sentially chosen not to provide for any additional regulation beyond
the fractured set of already existing laws and regulations outlined
therein.73  Critics of the Coordinated Framework suggest that so little
68. Id. at 108.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 110 (citing Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 940
(D.C. Cir.1986)) (“In this abstract factual setting, where no specific agency ac-
tions with an identifiable impact on the environment have been alleged, the
Court can determine neither the probable effect of the Framework definitions nor
their rationality.  Because no specific injury has been alleged, there can be no
showing of the ‘immediate and significant’ hardship from deferral of adjudication
that could support review of plaintiffs’ claim at this juncture.”).
72. Id. at 109 (“While the document is not a model of clarity, its treatment by the
agencies involved conclusively establishes it is merely a first effort to aid in for-
mulation of agency policy with respect to control of microorganisms developed by
genetic engineering techniques.”).
73. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,303
(June 26, 1986); Maggie Ellinger-Locke, Food Sovereignty is a Gendered Issue, 18
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 168 (2011) (“[T]he Framework has been implicitly upheld
because neither agencies nor the legislature has sought to provide additional reg-
ulation of genetically engineered products.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Dis-
trust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
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was accomplished in this regard because of inter-agency disputes that
discouraged any semblance of real coordination among the responsible
agencies.74
In what represented an arguably unsuccessful attempt to try and
balance the interests of keeping pace in a global market of rapidly de-
veloping technology with ensuring the health and safety of the human
and natural environment, the Coordinated Framework ultimately pro-
vided little guidance to the responsible agencies.  The jumbled and
confusing discussion of the mechanisms by which existing laws were
equipped to regulate products of genetic engineering, despite the fact
that many of these laws had never considered biotechnology, proved
relatively unhelpful.  Problematically, the OSTP left the bulk of regu-
lation up to a group of agencies that could not collectively agree on
how to regulate these products.
3. OSTP Final Statement of Policy
The OSTP issued its final statement of policy in 1992 upon the rec-
ognition that the Coordinated Framework provided broad strokes for
the agencies sharing responsibility over the regulation of the products
of biotechnology, but failed to address how they were to exercise that
responsibility.75  This policy was intended to provide the responsible
agencies with the “proper basis” for the exercise of decision making
within the bounds of the discretion afforded by the statutory
framework.76
Specifically, the policy detailed three principles that continue to
guide federal oversight of introductions of genetically-engineered
products into the environment.  First, decision making should be fo-
cused on “the characteristics of the biotechnology product and the en-
vironment into which it is being introduced, not the process by which
the product is created.”77  Second, the responsible agencies should
base their decisions on “the risk posed by the introduction and [deci-
sions] should not turn on the fact that an organism has been modified
by a particular process or technique.”78  With regard to this principle,
403, 432 (“[F]or all its complexity, the regulatory regime requires remarkably lit-
tle of the companies that develop and market GM foods.  The sponsor of a GM
food can at all critical junctures either substantially diminish regulatory over-
sight or avoid it altogether . . . .”).
74. Gore, supra note 23, at 24 (citing Proposal to End Regulatory Turf Fights, Amend
TSCA Is Drafted By Committee Staff, Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 84–85 (April 27,
1990)).
75. Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned In-
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the OSTP was clear that “limited federal oversight” should occur only
when the risk is “unreasonable,” meaning “when the value of the re-
duction in risk obtained by additional oversight is greater than the
cost thereby imposed.”79  Third, organisms that have “new phenotypic
trait(s)” which do not pose a greater risk than the “parental orga-
nisms” should not be subject to a greater level of oversight than the
original unaltered organism.80
According to the policy, this risk-based approach provided the ap-
propriate balance between ensuring safety while not unnecessarily
hindering innovation and development, and was supported by the
“great majority” of public comments received during the proposal
stage.81  This approach relied heavily on the findings of the National
Research Council, which determined that “organisms that have been
genetically modified are not per se of inherently greater risk than un-
modified organisms.”82  Following this line of reasoning, the policy is
careful to note that federal oversight may, in some instances, be either
duplicative of existing state laws or industry standards, or interfere
with those efforts, and, in those cases, the agencies should not be
wasteful of resources by exercising unnecessary oversight by deferring
to the efforts of industry when appropriate.83  Moreover, if an agency
79. Id. (“The extent and type of oversight measure(s) will thus be commensurate with
the gravity and type of risk being addressed, the costs of alternative oversight
options, and the effect of additional oversight on existing safety incentives.”).
80. Id. at 6756.
81. Id. at 6755.
82. Id. (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 51, at 3, 14–15, 123).  The
NRC made a number of findings.  National Research Council, supra note 51, at 3,
14–15, 123.  First, it determined that “[t]he same physical and biological laws
govern the response of organisms modified by modern molecular and cellular
methods and those produced by classical methods.” Id. at 15.  Second,
“[i]nformation about the process used to produce a genetically modified organism
is important in understanding the characteristics of the product.  However, the
nature of the process is not a useful criterion for determining whether the prod-
uct requires less or more oversight.” Id. at 14–15.  Third, “no conceptual distinc-
tion exists between genetic modification of plants and microorganisms by
classical methods or by molecular techniques that modify DNA and transfer
genes.” Id. at 14.  Fourth, “[c]rops modified by molecular and cellular methods
should pose risks no different from those modified by classical methods for simi-
lar traits.  As the molecular methods are more specific, users of these methods
will be more certain about the traits they introduce into the plants.  And finally,
“[i]n many respects, molecular methods resemble the classical methods for modi-
fying particular strains of microorganisms, but many of the new methods have
two features that make them even more useful than the classical methods.” Id.
at 123.
83. See Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned
Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. at
6761 (“[U]ncertainty related to the extent or effectiveness of Federal regulation
may lead to the enactment of a patchwork of conflicting and burdensome state
regulations. . . .  In general, to avoid unnecessary burdens on biotechnology, the
Administration has sought to eliminate unneeded regulatory burdens for all
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was evaluating the release of a comparable organism that had previ-
ously been released in a similar target environment, the policy dis-
couraged performance of another detailed risk evaluation.84  In
addition, the policy did not require any sort of assessment of the
“health and environmental effects of individual [genetically engi-
neered organisms].”85  Consequently, much of the precaution wit-
nessed in the early stages was replaced by a risk based approach that
essentially employed a cost-benefit analysis,86 which critics suggest
has led to the weak exercise of statutory authority on the part of the
responsible agencies.87  It has been suggested that this final policy
statement, therefore, “opened the way for deregulation of large-scale
environmental releases of transgenic plants,” which has had profound
impact on individuals choosing not to invest in these technologies.88
Regardless of whether GE plants and their non-GE counterparts are
the same, the federal policies failed to consider the practical effects of
the release of GE organisms in a manner that impacted another per-
son’s product that was dependent on it not containing GE organisms.
phases of the development of new biotechnology products . . . .  Existing regula-
tory structures . . . provide an adequate framework for regulation of biotechnol-
ogy in those limited instances where private markets fail to provide adequate
incentives to avoid unreasonable risks to health and the environment.”).  One
critic suggests that because this policy “is based in large part on a policy determi-
nation that agencies and companies should not have to waste resources on unnec-
essary testing and evaluation[;] . . . it [provides] an excuse for regulatory agencies
to avoid their responsibilities.”  McGarity, supra note 73, at 431.
84. See Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned
Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. at
6757.
85. Albert C. Lin, Technology Assessment 2.0: Revamping Our Approach to Emerging
Technologies, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (2011).
86. Some considered this a watershed moment for both the regulation of biotechnol-
ogy, as well as in the realm of risk assessment generally. E.g., Peter Mostow,
Reassessing the Scope of Federal Biotechnology Oversight, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
227, 232 (1992).
87. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 559 (2004) (citing
Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically
Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297 (2002); Gregory N. Mandel,
Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Ge-
netically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167 (2004); Em-
ily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified
Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733 (2003); McGarity, supra note 73).
88. David J. Earp, Comment, The Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants: Is
Peter Rabbit Safe in Mr. McGregor’s Transgenic Vegetable Patch?, 24 ENVTL. L.
1633, 1658 (1994).
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III. USDA’S REGULATORY AUTHORITY UNDER THE
PLANT PROTECTION ACT (PPA)89
Finding that “the detection, control, eradication, suppression, pre-
vention, or retardation of the spread of plant pests or noxious weeds is
necessary for the protection of the agriculture, environment, and econ-
omy of the United States,”90 Congress vested the USDA with responsi-
bility for regulating articles that could pose a plant pest risk.  The
PPA, enacted in 1957, “was intended as ‘gap filling’ legislation for the
purpose of protecting American agriculture against invasion by plant
pests and diseases which are new to or not theretofore known to be
widely prevalent or distributed within and throughout the United
States.”91  Additionally, the PPA granted the USDA authority to regu-
late insects or plants that might present a future risk to cultivated
crops.92  While not specifically drafted to address biotechnology, the
Act gives the USDA control over the introduction (which includes “im-
portation, entry, exportation, or movement”93) of certain genetically
engineered products or organisms.94  Through the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (the APHIS),95 the division of the USDA
charged with “protect[ing] the health and value of American agricul-
ture”—the Department of Agriculture—exercises regulatory control
over genetically-engineered products that the agency determines
could be plant pests.96  The USDA promulgated regulations to address
the introduction of genetically engineered organisms consistent with
the mandates under the PPA following the creation of the Coordinated
Framework.97
89. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 (2006).
90. Id. § 7701.
91. Final Policy Statement for Research and Regulation of Biotechnology Processes
and Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,336, 23,342 (June 26, 1986).
92. Id.
93. 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a).
94. Id.
95. APHIS describes itself as “a multi-faceted Agency with a broad mission area that
includes protecting and promoting U.S. agricultural health, regulating geneti-
cally engineered organisms, administering the Animal Welfare Act and carrying
out wildlife damage management activities.  These efforts support the overall
mission of USDA, which is to protect and promote food, agriculture, natural re-
sources and related issues.” About APHIS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT
INSPECTION SERV., http://www.the APHIS.usda.gov/about_the APHIS/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 14, 2012).
96. Id.
97. Final Policy Statement for Research and Regulation of Biotechnology Processes
and Products, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,336.
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Under the regulations, the APHIS restricts the “introduction”98 of
“regulated articles”99 that present a plant pest risk, unless the agency
has received notification of the introduction,100 the introduction is au-
thorized by permit,101 or the introduction is “conditionally exempt.”102
Plant pests are defined as “[a]ny living stage . . . or any orga-
nisms . . . or any infectious agents or substances, which can directly or
indirectly injure or cause disease or damage in or to any plants or
parts thereof, or any processed, manufactured, or other products of
plants.”103  Arguably, the APHIS has the ability to regulate any re-
lease of potential plant pests that could constitute a threat to agricul-
ture regardless of whether the release is intrastate or interstate.104
In addition, because of the manner in which the APHIS defined spe-
cific terms in the regulations, the agency has authority over geneti-
cally engineered plants either because of the type of plant, or the
materials and methods used in the process.105  Because the Act limits
the agency’s authority to regulating plant pests, a genetically engi-
neered organism is no longer subject to the provisions of the Act once
the APHIS has determined it does not pose a plant pest risk.
A. Releases into the Environment
For most introductions of genetically engineered plants, the
APHIS determined that the notification procedure was sufficient, ne-
98. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2012) (defining “introduce” or “introduction” as “[t]o move into
or through the United States, to release into the environment, to move interstate,
or any attempt thereat”).
99. Id. (defining “regulated articles” as “[a]ny organism which has been altered or
produced through genetic engineering, if the donor organism, recipient organism,
or vector or vector agent belongs to any genera or taxa designated in § 340.2 and
meets the definition of plant pest, or is an unclassified organism and/or an organ-
ism whose classification is unknown, or any product which contains such an or-
ganism, or any other organism or product altered or produced through genetic
engineering which the Administrator, determines is a plant pest or has reason to
believe is a plant pest.  Excluded are recipient microorganisms which are not
plant pests and which have resulted from the addition of genetic material from a
donor organism where the material is well characterized and contains only non-
coding regulatory regions”).
100. Id. § 340.0(a)(1) (requiring notification to be in accordance with 7 C.F.R. § 340.3).
101. Id. (requiring permits to be obtained in accordance with the requirements under
7 C.F.R. § 340.4).
102. Id. (explaining that conditions for exemptions are specified in 7 C.F.R.
§ 340.2(b)(2)).
103. Id. § 340.1.  The PPA also defines the term “plant pest.” See Plant Protection Act,
7 U.S.C. § 7702(14) (2006).
104. John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environmen-
tal Law of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 839 (2001).
105. Id. (citing Earp, supra note 88, at 1644).  The agency “makes a default assump-
tion that GM crops qualify as plant pests” under the regulations.  Andrew W.
Torrance, Planted Obsolescence: Synagriculture and the Law, 48 IDAHO L. REV.
321, 337 (2012).
786 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:767
gating the need for a permit authorized by the agency.106  The APHIS
reached this conclusion based on its experience with hundreds of per-
mit applications for field releases and over one thousand permits for
movement.107  Specifically, the APHIS determined that most regu-
lated articles could be introduced into the environment with “little or
no plant pest or environmental risk, provided that certain criteria and
performance standards are met.”108  During the field-test–trial stage,
because the release of the plants is still regulated by the APHIS, the
agency can include certain conditions, such as containment protocols
to protect surrounding crops from reproducing with or being contami-
nated by the test crops.109
Some argue that the regulations fail to address both the regulation
of genetically engineered plants to minimize environmental risk and
the additional risks posed by such products that go beyond the consid-
erations of what constitutes a “plant pest.”110  Indeed, the regulations
fail to take into account the fact that, if not controlled very specifi-
cally, the release of a genetically-engineered organism could seriously
affect nearby organic and non-GE crops.  An internal audit in 2005 by
the Inspector General of the USDA revealed that the agency was una-
ware of the location of many field test trials and failed to review—and
in some instances, even require—written containment protocols de-
tailing how the applicant intends to contain the genetically engineered
organisms.111  Moreover, the USDA did not require applicants to sub-
mit any sort of final disposition information, which, in some instances
led to storage of GE organisms, whose unintentional release could
have posed a safety issue, for over a year without the APHIS’ approval
106. Genetically Engineered Organisms & Products; Notification Procedures for the
Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; & Petition for Nonregulated Status,
57 Fed. Reg. 53,036–37 (explaining that prior to this proposal, all introductions
had to occur by permit and each permit application was assessed on a “case by
case basis”).
107. Id.
108. Id. (detailing criteria and standards).  “In 2004, almost 97 percent of all field tri-
als of regulated GE crops were conducted under notifications.” U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SW. REGION, AUDIT REPORT, ANIMAL &
PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE CONTROLS OVER ISSUANCE OF GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED ORGANISM RELEASE PERMITS 2 (2005), available at http:// www.usda.
gov/oig/webdocs/50601-08-TE.pdf [hereinafter AUDIT REPORT].  “Currently, most
regulated GE plants are introduced under notification, which is a streamlined
procedure.  Examples of GE plants introduced under the notification procedure
are those GE plants altered to be resistant to certain insects or herbicides.”  Im-
portation, Interstate Movement, & Release Into the Environment of Certain Ge-
netically Engineered Organisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,008, 60,010 (Oct. 9, 2008).
109. 7 C.F.R. § 340.4 (2012).
110. E.g., Mary Jane Angelo, Regulating Evolution for Sale: An Evolutionary Biology
Model for Regulating the Unnatural Selection of Genetically Modified Organisms,
42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 93, 137 (2007).
111. AUDIT REPORT, supra note 108, at i–ii.
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or knowledge of the storage facility’s location.112  The internal audit
also revealed that the APHIS does not “effectively track information
required during the field tests, including approved applicants’ pro-
gress reports, which should contain the results of field tests, including
any harmful effects on the environment.”113  The APHIS has since
proposed eliminating the notification procedure, as the standards are
too general and permits can “provide more specific information about
what procedures the permit holder must follow in order to be in
compliance.”114
B. Petitions for Nonregulated Status
In 1993, the APHIS amended its original regulations and provided,
among other things, for a petition process allowing individuals to seek
determinations that certain plants would no longer be designated as
regulated articles.115  In response to the proposed regulations regard-
ing the petition process, the APHIS received eleven comments in favor
and ten comments that suggested further amendment or deletion.116
In the notice, the APHIS discussed one comment that argued any data
considered in the petition process must include “peer reviewed scien-
tific studies.”117  The agency disagreed with this argument, sug-
gesting that because any data submitted as part of the petition
process is reviewed by the APHIS’s scientific staff and those determi-
nations are then passed on to the public during the notice and com-
ment period,118 adequate scientific review is provided.119  In other
words, for those individuals who wanted to ensure that the APHIS
had considered the best science available when making a determina-
tion of a petition for nonregulated status, it was potentially their re-
sponsibility to not only perform those studies, but to then submit them
as part of the comment process.  The APHIS views the petition process
as merely procedural despite the fact that it “may result in an organ-
112. Id.
113. Id. at ii.
114. Importation, Interstate Movement, and Release Into the Environment of Certain
Genetically Engineered Organisms, 73 Fed. Reg. at 60,008, 60,016.
115. See Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Notification Procedures for
the Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; and Petition for Nonregulated
Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 17,044 (March 31, 1993) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
116. Id. at 17,054.
117. Id.
118. See id. (“The new procedures include an opportunity for public comment and pub-
lic review of the data that has been submitted to THE APHIS in support of a
petition for determination of nonregulated status.  State regulatory agencies, aca-
demic institutions, and individual research scientists will have the opportunity to
present all relevant information to the agency pertaining to a specific organism
prior to a determination of nonregulated status by THE APHIS.”).
119. Id.
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ism no longer being regulated after a thorough and comprehensive
plant pest and environmental analysis.”120
In large part, the current version of 7 C.F.R. § 340.6 reflects the
statements made in the 1993 notice, with the exception that the re-
quirements demonstrate OSTP’s desire for the agencies to make the
best use of their resources and not engage in unnecessary work so that
a person can now streamline a petition for nonregulated status on the
basis that it is similar to an “antecedent organism.”121  Under the cur-
rent regulation, any person can file a petition seeking non-regulated
status of a particular genetically engineered plant.122  Accompanying
the petition, the petitioner must present “[r]elevant experimental data
and publications”123 and “[f]ield test reports.”124  Upon receipt of the
petition, the APHIS will publish notice in the Federal Register and
allow for a sixty (60) day comment period,125 review the data to deter-
mine whether the article poses a “plant pest” risk,126 and furnish a
response to the petitioner within one hundred eighty days.127  Once
the agency makes the determination that a genetically-engineered
plant does not present a “plant pest” risk and deregulates it, the plant
can be introduced into the commercial market and planted without
further federal oversight from the USDA.128  Practically speaking,
this means a farmer can plant a genetically engineered crop without
necessarily taking into consideration the different methods of food
production occurring in the vicinity.  From the agency’s perspective,
the determination that a GE crop does not present a plant pest risk
“takes into account various risk factors, including, among other
things, a low risk that the GE organism or its progeny can persist,
reproduce, and establish without human assistance.”129  For those
plants that are similar to their predecessors, the process may be fur-
ther streamlined.  Effectively, this precludes any further considera-
tion by the APHIS of negative effects or risks posed by the genetically
engineered organism upon deregulation.
While the APHIS recognizes that it needs to revise the regulations
pertaining to GE organisms, it has yet to take any final action on the
rule proposed on October 9, 2008.130  With regard to determinations of
120. Id. at 17,054.
121. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(e) (2012).
122. Id. § 340.6(a).
123. Id. § 340.6(c)(2).
124. Id. § 340.6(c)(5).
125. Id. § 340.6(d)(2).
126. Id. § 340.6(e).
127. Id. § 340.6(d)(3).
128. USDA, supra note 15.
129. Importation, Interstate Movement, & Release Into the Environment of Certain
Genetically Engineered Organisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,008, 60,010 (proposed Oct. 9,
2008) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
130. Id.
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nonregulated status, the agency proposed a mechanism by which it
can revisit that decision and revoke the status if it later receives infor-
mation that the plant poses a plant pest risk.131  Despite this pro-
posed change, the APHIS is nonetheless comfortable that any
decisions made prior to the rule change will be automatically ap-
proved for nonregulated status based on the demonstrated history of
years of safe use.132  It remains unclear what the status of these pro-
posed revisions is and whether the agency will formalize them into a
final rule.  Until that point, determinations on petitions for nonregu-
lated status continue to occur in the same manner without the oppor-
tunity for someone to later challenge that determination based on an
injury.  This presents significant problems for organic and non-GE
farmers whose crops become contaminated by non-regulated GE
plants.
IV. DISPUTES RESULTING FROM FEDERAL POLICIES
REGARDING BIOTECHNOLOGY
Considering the federal government’s historically strong endorse-
ment of biotechnology, it is no wonder that the current lax and out-
dated regulatory scheme has led to disputes between farmers who
embrace the technology and those who do not.  By way of example, in a
recent draft environmental assessment on a petition by Dow AgroS-
cience (DAS) seeking nonregulated status of herbicide tolerant DAS-
40278-9 Corn, Event DAS-40278-9 (referred to by advocacy groups as
“Agent Orange” corn133), the agency acknowledged that crop contami-
nation for organic and non-GE varieties of corn is not unlikely given
the manner in which corn “naturally cross pollinates.”134 To avoid
such contamination, the agency suggests that organic farmers notify
their neighbors that they are using “organic production practices” and
ask that “the neighbors also help the organic farmer reduce potential
contamination events.”135  However, given the fact that organic pro-
131. Id. at 60,024.
132. See id.
133. E.g., Ctr. for Food Safety, Food Safety Fact Sheet, “Agent Orange” Corn: The Next
Stage in the Chemical Arms Race (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.
centerforfoodsafety.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Agent_orange_corn_fact-
sheet.pdf.
134. USDA, supra note 15, at 23.  “Contamination of organic corn crops is a concern
because corn naturally cross pollinates.  Contamination can occur from impure
seed; seed admixture; volunteer plants; and residual non-organic seed in the
equipment, vehicles, and facilities.  Farmers using organic methods are re-
quested to let neighboring farmers know that they are using organic production
practices and request that the neighbors also help the organic farmer reduce po-
tential contamination events.  Delayed planting has been used successfully by
some organic corn producers to control weeds and to avoid potential contamina-
tion by GE pollen from adjacent fields.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
135. Id.
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duction is so strongly regulated by the National Organic Program and
genetically engineered corn that becomes deregulated is effectively not
regulated, it appears the burden expressed by this agency policy flows
in the wrong direction.  Moreover, such cautionary advice is not pro-
vided to conventional farmers who choose not to use GE seed and may
suffer the same fate.
A. Basics of Crop Contamination
Concerns about instances of crop contamination due to either the
intentional or unintentional release of genetically engineered orga-
nisms have risen to the level that advocacy groups developed a GM
Contamination Register, wherein all reported instances of national
and international crop contamination are included in a public
database.136  Not surprisingly, given the nature of the plants and
their ability to cross-pollinate, in the United States alone there have
been numerous reports of instances of transgenic contamination, most
notably in the papaya plant population in Hawaii.137  Crop contami-
nation can occur for many reasons.  In some instances, crops can be-
come contaminated simply due to the inadvertent planting of GE seed
in a non-GE planting field or, more commonly, as the result of mixing
of GE seed with non-GE seed.138  The method that occurs with the
highest degree of unpredictability and causes farmers understandable
consternation is cross-pollination or hybridization, the potential for
which depends on the plant species.139  Hybridization between plants
occurs from the spread of pollen.140  Because hybridization can occur
over long distances, as several studies have demonstrated, it “may be
difficult to control gene flow” from GE to non-GE crops.141  The degree
of gene flow that can occur between a GE and non-GE crops depends
on the reproductive strategy of the plant—some, like corn, are open
pollinated, meaning pollination can occur by birds, insects, wind, or
136. See GM CONTAMINATION REGISTER, http://www.gmcontaminationregister.org (last
visited Oct. 26, 2012).
137. See Hawaii—GM papaya trees have contaminated both organic and conventional
non-GM papaya on a wide scale, GM CONTAMINATION REGISTER, http://www.gm
contaminationregister.org/index.php?content=re_detail&gw_id=19&reg=cou.1&
inc=0&con=0&cof=0&year=2004&handle2_page= (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
138. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE IMPACT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS
ON FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 104 (2010) [hereinafter NRC,
IMPACT] (citing Norman C. Ellstrand, Current Knowledge of Gene Flow In Plants:
Implications for Transgene Flow, 358 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y B
1163, 1163–70 (2003)), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=
12804.
139. Id.
140. Anna Kuparinen, Frank Schurr, Oliver Tackenberg, & Robert B. O’Hara, Air-
Mediated Pollen Flow from Genetically Modified to Conventional Crops, 17 ECO-
LOGICAL APPLICATIONS 431, 431 (2007).
141. Id.
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other natural processes, whereas other plants are self or closed pol-
linated.142  Those crops that are open pollinated possess the greatest
potential for gene flow.143
While field trials have attempted to “study gene flow at a realistic
agricultural scale,” they fail to fully account for environmental varia-
tions that may have an effect.144  However, one scientific study at-
tempted to account for these variations.145  It determined that while
the “mean level of contamination” decreased as the distance between
crops increased, there were “high levels of contamination over long
distances” in some trials.146  This led the researchers to conclude that
the variation was due to vertical updrafts which were caused by insta-
bility in the atmosphere, making management practices or measures
directed at reducing contamination unhelpful.147  Consequently,
“[f]rom the point of view of farmers and managers, variation in wind
conditions is a component of inherent uncertainty that makes it diffi-
cult to forecast levels of contamination in a specific situation.”148  Of
the factors that are “controllable,” scientists concluded that “both the
size of the [GE] field and the spatial configuration of the fields had
some effect on the predicted level of gene flow.”149  In other words,
smaller and shallower fields appeared to contribute less to gene flow
meaning that farmers should engage in discussions about these issues
when addressing coexistence.150  Other scientists concluded that “the
distances needed to prevent any cross-pollination in corn or other
open-pollinated crops are so great that they are not practical in cur-
rent commercial agricultural systems.”151
Clearly, gene flow between GE and non-GE crops can have the ef-
fect of rendering an organic or non-GE farmer’s entire crop “unsuita-
ble” for its intended market due to the presence of GE organisms.152
Thus, if the farmer has taken certain additional—and usually costly—
142. NRC, IMPACT, supra note 138, at 104.
143. Id. However, “[e]ven in self-pollinated plants, out-crossing occurs occasionally,
the rate depending on the particular species and environment.” Id.
144. Kuparinen et al., supra note 140, at 432.
145. Id. at 437.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing James S. Clark et al., Ecological Forecasts: An Emerging Imperative,
293 SCIENCE 657 (2001); James S. Clark et al., Estimating Population Spread:
What Can We Forecast and How Well?, 84 ECOLOGY 1979 (2003)).
149. Id. at 439.
150. See id.
151. NRC, IMPACT, supra note 138, at 105 (citing S. Luna V. et al., Maize Pollen Lon-
gevity and Distance Isolation Requirements for Effective Pollen Control, 44 CROP
SCI., 1551 (2001); M. A. Matus-Ca´diz et al., Gene Flow in Wheat at the Field
Scale, 44 CROP SCI. 718 (2004)).
152. Id. at 169–70 (citing David S. Bullock et al., The Economics of Non-GMO Segrega-
tion and Identity Preservation, 27 FOOD POLICY 81 (2002)).
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measures to produce a product for a high yield (such as organic or non-
GMO) market, the farmer can suffer great economic loss from crop
contamination.  Beyond the economic impacts, such contamination
can also have an impact on the level of trust between these different
groups of farmers,153 the federal government exacerbates the problem
by requiring organic and non-GE farmers to protect themselves from
contamination.154  Because it is so difficult to control the adventitious
presence155 of GE organisms and organic producers have to comply
with the National Organic Program (“NOP”), which does not permit
the use of genetic engineering, policies allowing for a certain degree of
adventitious presence have been developed to enable the coexistence
of GE, non-GE, and organic foods.156  However, the costs associated
with keeping crops GE free, organic or otherwise, are significant.
Farmers who wish to keep their products free of GE organisms must
establish “buffer zones, whose needed size is uncertain, cleaning
equipment, inspections of crops and processing facilities, and frequent
testing” which can be quite expensive after harvest.157  Even for farm-
ers who undertake these precautionary measures, there remains a
risk that other farmers will illegally plant GE crops, further decreas-
ing the possibility of coexistence.158  To date, there have been no re-
ported lawsuits where a farmer has sued another farmer for harm due
153. Id.
154. A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies, The Common Law of Biotechnology and
Economic Liability Risks, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 115, 142 (2008) (“The govern-
ment . . . has repeatedly resolved the question of who should be responsible for
preserving the integrity of a non-genetically modified (conventional or organic)
harvest in favor of the farmer adopting the new, genetically engineered technol-
ogy, regardless of the amount of disruption it may cause on established farming
practices.”).
155. Defined as the “[g]ene flow of approved GE traits into non-GE varieties of the
same crops.”  NRC, IMPACT, supra note 138, at 9.
156. Id. at 172 (citing Matty Demont, & Yann Devos, Regulating Coexistence of GM
and Non-GM Crops Without Jeopardizing Economic Incentive, 26 TRENDS IN BI-
OTECH., 353 (2008); Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6522
(1990)) (“For example, in the United States, voluntary labeling of food as GE-free
is allowed as long as a product contains less than 5-percent adventitious presence
of GE material.  In contrast, the EU allows up to 0.9-percent adventitious GE
material in non-GE food, animal feed, and products labeled as organic if the GE
crop has been approved in the EU; otherwise, the threshold is zero.”).
157. HARVEY BLATT, AMERICA’S FOOD: WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW ABOUT WHAT YOU EAT
106 (2008).  “Although requiring buffer zones between genetically engineered
crops and natural crops is a step in the right direction, many farmers are not
following the regulations, and even with full compliance, it would be impossible
to entirely eliminate the risk of contamination by genetically engineered pollen.”
Sophia Kolehmainen, Precaution Before Profits: An Overview of Issues in Geneti-
cally Engineered Food and Crops, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 280 (2001) (citing
Farmers Unclear About Biotech Rules, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb.1, 2001), http://
www.nytimes.com/2001/02/01/health/01ap-biotech.html?pagewanted=all).
158. Alison Peck, The New Imperialism: Toward an Advocacy Strategy for GMO Ac-
countability, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 46 (2008).
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to genetic crop contamination,159 however, farmers have at least put
the issue of crop contamination before the courts in a few different
contexts.
B. Bringing the Issue of Crop Contamination Before the
Courts
1. In re StarLink Corn Products160
The issues raised in StarLink likely first came to the attention of
the public when Kraft Foods announced a nationwide recall of its taco
shells after discovering they contained genetically engineered corn
that had not been approved for human consumption.161  In 2002, a
group of plaintiffs that included farmers whose crops had been con-
taminated by StarLink corn filed suit in District Court in the North-
ern District of Illinois (Eastern Division) alleging, among other things,
that the defendant—manufacturers of StarLink—created a private
nuisance by distributing the corn seeds “knowing that they would
cross-pollinate with neighboring corn crops.”162  Specifically, they al-
leged that they could not “enjoy the profits of their land (selling food
corn), because of an unreasonable activity on neighboring land (grow-
ing StarLink corn).”163  The EPA had given the defendant a special
mandate to only use its corn for “animal feed, ethanol production, and
seed increase”—not for human consumption due to the presence of a
protein in the corn that had attributes similar to human allergen
properties.164  To meet these obligations, the EPA required the de-
fendants to take certain precautionary and protective measures and
inform purchasers of the specific limitations on use.165
While StarLink involved a lawsuit attempting to hold a manufac-
turer responsible for distributing a product that the EPA had yet to
approve, the language the court used when finding that the private
nuisance claim was appropriate may likely have a future effect on any
cases involving crop contamination due to drift.  Additionally, it ap-
pears to flip the burden the APHIS has adopted as a matter of course
on its head.  Specifically, the court stated, that “[r]esidue from a prod-
uct drifting across property lines presents a typical nuisance claim.
159. Neil D. Hamilton, Forced Feeding: New Legal Issues in the Biotechnology Policy
Debate, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 53–54 (2005) (“[T]he development of legal
precedent addressing this issue has been limited.”).
160. 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
161. Andrew Pollack, Kraft Recalls Taco Shells With Bioengineered Corn, NEW YORK
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/23/business/kraft-re-
calls-taco-shells-with-bioengineered-corn.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
162. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
163. Id. at 847.
164. Id. at 834.
165. Id.
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All parties who substantially contribute to the nuisance are liable.”166
This suggests that in a case where a farmer’s crops have been contam-
inated such that the farmer cannot enjoy the profits because of the
unreasonable activities on neighboring land, the farmer may be able
to sustain claims to recover from multiple parties who “substantially
contribute[d]” to the nuisance, including the manufacturers.167  More-
over, the plaintiffs were able to maintain a public nuisance claim be-
cause, although “the general public has a right to safe food, plaintiffs
depend on the integrity of the corn supply for their livelihood.”168  For
some farmers unable to afford a lawsuit, they may be able to convince
a local agency or authority to pursue a public nuisance suit under this
theory.169  Even though this case was ultimately settled, the court ap-
proved the $110 million settlement to compensate the farmers who
suffered losses, demonstrating the court’s willingness to hold manu-
facturers liable for market losses due to contamination from their GE
products.170
2. Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms171
As the first case before the United States Supreme Court to ad-
dress genetically engineered plants, the decision in Geerston holds
special significance even if the opinion ultimately left advocates disap-
pointed.  Specifically, the district court considered an issue of first im-
pression: “[W]hether the introduction of a genetically engineered crop
that might significantly decrease the availability or even eliminate all
non-genetically engineered varieties is a ‘significant environmental
impact’ requiring the preparation of an environmental impact state-
ment, at least when it involves the fourth largest crop in the United
166. Id.
167. “The StarLink litigation and settlement is perhaps the most significant develop-
ment because it establishes responsibility for damages resulting from the use of
the technology.  However, because the case involved a violation of the regulatory
approval of the product, it may not serve as controlling precedent in the more
difficult case where the lawful use of an approved product results in measurable
commercial damages to a non-compatible crop.”  Hamilton, supra note 159, at 54.
168. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
169. Thomas Connor, Genetically Modified Torts: Enlisting the Tort System to Regu-
late Agricultural Contamination by Biotech Crops, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1205
(2007) (“A farmer who has suffered an economic loss due to the genetic contami-
nation from his neighbor’s crops might argue that although the public is harmed
by a risk to the food supply’s safety, he is harmed by physical damage to his crops
and the inability to sell his crops . . . .”).
170. A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, United States Food Law Update: Mov-
ing Toward a More Balanced Food Regulatory Regime, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 383,
414 (2011) (citing Thomas P. Redick & Donald L. Uchtmann, Coexistence
Through Contracts: Export-Oriented Stewardship in Agricultural Biotechnology
vs. California’s Precautionary Containment, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 207, 214
(2008)).
171. 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
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States.”172  The plaintiffs, composed of the Sierra Club, consumers,
and farmers, originally brought suit against the USDA for its decision
to deregulate Roundup Ready (RR) Alfalfa without completing an en-
vironmental impact statement (EIS), as required by the National En-
vironmental Policy Act.173  After completing an environmental
assessment (EA), the agency made a finding of no significant impact
(FONSI) despite receiving 663 comments, 520 of which were opposed
to the deregulation.174  One of the primary concerns expressed in the
public comments addressed the recognized potential for gene flow due
to pollen drift from the genetically engineered alfalfa to organic and
conventional alfalfa, which could result in crop contamination.175
Despite these concerns, the APHIS granted the petition in whole
and deregulated the RR alfalfa acknowledging that, upon deregula-
tion, the crop would not be subject to any isolation distances.176  The
APHIS predicated this determination on the position that organic and
conventional growers who wish to avoid contamination should employ
production methods to avoid cross-pollination.177  The court found this
point significant—the APHIS rested its finding of no significant im-
pact to organic and conventional growers without making any deter-
mination about whether those farmers could “in fact, protect their
crops from contamination.”178  Consequently, the court held this de-
termination did not provide the “hard look” NEPA required and
opined that the drafting of an EIS would give the agency the opportu-
nity to more fully analyze the “realistic measures” that might be taken
to prevent contamination, particularly since the agency chose not to
exercise its authority to approve the “petition with a geographic limi-
tation stipulating that the Roundup Ready could only be grown with-
out the APHIS authorization in certain geographic areas.”179
At the remedies phase, Monsanto and Forage Genetics intervened
because of the possibility of a preliminary injunction enjoining the
APHIS from deregulating the alfalfa without completing an EIS, as
well as all planting of RR alfalfa and all sales of RR alfalfa seed.180
After hearing Monsanto’s arguments about the impacts such an in-
junction could have on farmers who already purchased the seed, the
172. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624 at *1
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007).
173. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (2006).




178. Id. at *6.
179. Id.
180. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 541 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 570
F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
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court entered the injunction with prospective effect.181  On appeal, the
only issue before the Court involved the question of whether the dis-
trict court should have imposed the injunction pending the completion
of an EIS by the APHIS.182  The Court assumed, without making a
decision, that the district court’s determination to vacate the APHIS’s
deregulation decision without an EIS was lawful since the parties did
not challenge it.183  While the Court ultimately determined that the
injunction was unlawful because it forbade the APHIS from partially
deregulating RR alfalfa and allowing for its release subject to restric-
tions aimed at preventing cross-pollination, the Court did, at least ac-
knowledge that such contamination presents an issue.184  It noted
that “if the scope of the partial deregulation is sufficiently limited, the
risk of gene flow to their crops could be virtually nonexistent.”185  In
other words, the Court did not simply ignore the fact that contamina-
tion due to gene flow is not only a possibility, but it challenged the
assumption that organic and non-GE farmers must, alone, be respon-
sible for segregation to avoid contamination.186
3. Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack187
After yet another controversial deregulation decision by the
APHIS, this one involving RR sugar beets, a group of plaintiffs, in-
cluding the Center for Food Safety, Organic Seed Alliance, High Mow-
ing Organic Seeds, and the Sierra Club, challenged the decision on the
basis that the APHIS again failed to complete an EIS prior to deregu-
lation, and sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the “planting,
cultivation, processing, or other use” of RR alfalfa seeds.188  The lower
court cited statements by the APHIS that echoed the same policy de-
terminations from Geerston, as the agency concluded that it did not
need to consider the potential economic impacts from crop contamina-
tion to organic and conventional farmers, and, in any event, those
farmers were responsible for taking measure to ensure that such
cross-pollination did not occur.189
Following the same line of reasoning as the court in Geerston, the
district court found that “the potential elimination of farmer’s choice
to grow non-genetically engineered crops, or a consumer’s choice to eat
non-genetically engineered food, and an action that potentially elimi-
181. Id.
182. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
183. Id. at 2756.
184. Id. at 2760.
185. Id.
186. Endres, supra note 154, at 142.
187. 734 F. Supp. 2d 948 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
188. Id. at 950.
189. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227, at *8
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009).
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nates or reduces the availability of a particular plant has a significant
effect on the human environment” requiring the APHIS to complete
an EIS.190  On appeal, while deciding not to grant an injunction based
on the decision in Geerston, the court agreed that vacatur of the
APHIS’s deregulation decision was appropriate.191  It took matters a
step further, suggesting that “the APHIS’s apparent position that it is
merely a matter of time before they reinstate the same deregulation
decision, or a modified version of this decision, and thus apparent per-
ception that . . . conducting the requisite comprehensive review is a
mere formality, causes some concern that Defendants are not taking
this process seriously.”192  This admonishment from the court, coupled
with the fact that this represented another decision to remand a der-
egulation determination back to the APHIS with instructions that the
EIS needs to more fully consider the effects on organic and non-GE
farmers suggests courts are likely to be sympathetic to the real risk
posed by gene flow.
4. Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association (OSGATA) v.
Monsanto193
The most recent case to address the issue of crop contamination
was decided in February, 2012.  In OSGATA, a group of farmers, seed
businesses, and advocacy organizations sought declaratory judgments
preventing Monsanto from attempting to hold the plaintiffs liable for
patent violations when their crops become contaminated with pat-
ented genetically-engineered organisms.194  The plaintiffs were ulti-
mately unsuccessful because they failed to adequately allege that any
of their crops were actually contaminated, or that Monsanto had pur-
sued actions either against them or others who were similarly situ-
ated.195  The court, however, acknowledged that despite Monsanto’s
restrictions, “some unlicensed—and unintended—use of transgenic
190. Id.
191. Ctr. for Food Safety, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
192. Id. at 953.
193. 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y 2012).
194. Id. at 547.
195. The issue of whether the plaintiffs failed to make the requisite showing that
Monsanto has pursued similar actions against similarly situated farmers is one
that critics suggest the court decided incorrectly.  While there are no reported
cases of Monsanto suing a farmer whose crop was contaminated by their seed
through no action on the farmer’s part, the case of David Runyon, a farmer who
did not purchase Monsanto seed was threatened with a lawsuit after Monsanto
discovered that his crops contained traces of their seed, has received national
attention. See e.g., CBS Evening News: Agricultural Giant Battles Small Farm-
ers, (CBS television broadcast Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.
com/2100-18563_162-4048288.html.  Monsanto has ceased any further action, yet
his experience forms the basis for the plaintiffs’ claims in OSGATA.  See OS-
GATA, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 547–48.
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seeds is inevitable.”196  Similar to other courts considering the issue of
crop contamination, this court recognized that “transgenic seeds may
contaminate non-transgenic crops through a variety of means.”197
Moreover, the court did not foreclose the possibility that a farmer
could become decertified as organic through the National Organic Pro-
gram as a result of such contamination.
Advocates were understandably incensed about the court’s decision
and have since appealed it.198  However, in one sense, it represents
yet another court that has recognized the real harm posed to organic
and non-GE farmers by GE crops.  Each of these decisions increases
the knowledge base of the judicial system and also paves the way for a
suit where a farmer who has suffered harm through crop contamina-
tion can seek to recover.  However, the issues of causation and identi-
fying the appropriate responsible party may pose insurmountable
challenges for some parties.199  For the GE grower, the tort system
will likely prove insufficient to minimize the risk of such disputes and
fail to provide the appropriate standard of care.200  In addition, such
suits may be cost prohibitive for the small organic or non-GE farmer.
Taking these considerations into account, it is imperative for farmers
and the agencies involved in these disputes, whether directly or indi-
rectly, to identify resolutions that provide some degree of certainty to
the parties involved.
V. MOVING FORWARD
The issue of coexistence is not one that receives much attention
from advocates; yet, the past few years have witnessed a surge in dis-
cussions about sustainable agriculture and the need for farmers to re-
consider the way they do business.  An important consideration
196. OSGATA, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
197. Id.
198. Brief of Appellants, OSGATA, 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (No. 11-CV-2163), available at
http://www.pubpat.org/assets/files/seed/OrganicSeedCAFCBrief.pdf.
199. Amanda L. Kool, Halting Pig in the Parlor Patents: Nuisance as a Tool to Redress
Crop Contamination, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 453, 482 (2010) (suggesting that farmers
might be better served suing the seed patent owners rather than farmer neigh-
bors because “attempting to establish liability against a farmer who grows GM
crops likely would present a serious causation problem, especially in geographic
areas in which GM crops are pervasive”); Michael Faure & Andri Wibisana, Lia-
bility for Damage Caused by GMOs: An Economic Perspective, 23 GEO. INT’L
ENVT’L. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2011) (“Then the question arises of how the law should
deal with uncertainty when it cannot be established with certainty who caused
the problem.  This is especially true if liability is channeled to the farmers, by
which the plaintiff has to prove which of the neighboring GM farmers caused the
damage.”).
200. Connor, supra note 169, at 1211–12 (compounding the issue of “ambiguity of the
reasonableness standard is that public attitudes differ sharply on the value and
danger associated with biotech crops”).
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lacking from many of these conversations, however, is the recognition
that, justifiably or not, agriculture in the United States is comprised
of several different methods of production.  To achieve a system that is
truly sustainable, it is necessary to start seriously considering the
ways in which these different production methods can coexist, because
it is unlikely the United States will ever completely ban the products
of genetic engineering.  To effectively do this, advocates need to take
into account the interests of all parties and find the areas of agree-
ment while encouraging farmers to work collaboratively with one an-
other to protect their own products while also ensuring the protection
of their neighbors’ crops.
To date, the burden of ensuring that organic and non-GE crops are
protected from gene flow has been on  organic and non-GE farmers,201
this position is both reflected in the APHIS’s policies and supported by
the assumption that because organic products yield higher costs, those
farmers are in the best position to undertake additional precautionary
measures.202  However, this is not necessarily the same position taken
outside the United States.  In the European Union (EU), for example,
the European Commission has taken the position that “[c]o-existence
measures should avoid any unnecessary burden for farmers, seed pro-
ducers, cooperatives and other operators associated with any produc-
tion type.”203  One potential measure the Commission identified to aid
in coexistence is the creation of GE free zones, which requires the ex-
clusion of GE crops from large areas.204  Rather than placing the bur-
den exclusively on  organic and non-GE growers, the EU Commission
recognizes this is a responsibility to be shared by all farmers without
one segment being unnecessarily burdened.  Some of these measures
have also been considered in the United States, however, there is not
yet an overarching national policy guiding these determinations, as
there is in the EU.
201. Infra, section IV.A.
202. Erik Stokstad, Can Biotech and Organic Farmers Get Along?, 332 SCIENCE 166,
167 (2011) (“Economists point out that these costs are generally compensated by
the premium price fetched by organic crops.”).
203. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION OF 13 JULY 2010 ON
GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL CO-EXISTENCE MEASURES TO AVOID
THE UNINTENDED PRESENCE OF GMOS IN CONVENTIONAL AND ORGANIC CROPS 1
(2010) (emphasis added), available at http://ecob.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/
CoexRecommendation.pdf.
204. Id. (stating that, with regard to the creation of GE free zones, “[t]his possibility
should rest on the demonstration by the Member States that, for those areas,
other measures are not sufficient to prevent the unintended presence of GMOs in
conventional or organic crops.  Moreover the restriction measures needs to be pro-
portionate to the objective (i.e. protection of particular needs of conventional or
organic farmers)”).
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Rather, in the United States, coexistence is addressed through a
myriad of stewardship best practices developed by industry,205 volun-
tary efforts on the part of organic and non-GE growers,206 and state
and local regulation207 aimed at restricting the planting of GE orga-
nisms in certain areas.  Such a fragmented system fails to incorporate
the coordinated response needed to address the issue of how farmers
can coexist to best serve the food production needs of the American
public.  Recognizing the need for a multi-stakeholder group, composed
of representatives from various interested sectors, to collectively con-
sider the issue of coexistence, USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack, recon-
vened the Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and the 21st Century
to specifically address three issues, with the third to be considered
only after completion of the first two:
1. What types of compensation mechanisms, if any, would be appropriate to
address economic losses by farmers in which the value of their crops is
reduced by unintended presence of GE material(s)?
2. What would be necessary to implement such mechanisms?  That is, what
would be the eligibility standard for a loss and what tools and triggers
(e.g., tolerances, testing protocols, etc.) would be needed to verify and
measure such losses and determine if claims are compensable?
3. In addition to the above, what other actions would be appropriate to bol-
ster or facilitate coexistence among different agricultural production sys-
tems in the United States?208
Since August, 2011, the AC21 met several times with the ultimate
goal of creating a report for submission to Secretary Vilsack on Sep-
tember 30.209  Completion of the final report was delayed for delivery
between November/December to allow the parties an opportunity to
reach consensus on the recommendations included therein.210  Farm-
205. See, e.g., Biotech Stewardship, EXCELLENCE THROUGH STEWARDSHIP, http://www.
excellencethroughstewardship.org/BiotechStewardship.aspx (last visited Oct. 26,
2012).
206. Blatt, supra note 157 (“[B]uffer zones, whose needed size is uncertain, cleaning
equipment, inspections of crops and processing facilities, and frequent testing.”).
207. In California, several counties and cities passed GMO bans prohibiting the rais-
ing, growing and cultivation of seeds and crops containing genetically engineered
organisms.  Anne Hillson, A New View of U.S. Agriculture, Center for Food Safety
6 (May 2006), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/US_Ag_Report.pdf.  In
Boulder, Colorado, it is illegal to plant GEOs on public land. Id. at 7.  In Maine, a
town passed a resolution declaring itself a GMO free zone. Id. at 15.  In Vermont,
83 towns passed resolutions against GMOs. Id. at 32.
208. USDA, ADVISORY COMM. ON BIOTECH. & 21ST CENTURY AGRIC. (AC21), WORKING
DRAFT OF AC21 REPORT FOR DISCUSSION AT AUGUST 27–28 MTG. 1 (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=AC21Main.xml
&contentidonly=true.
209. USDA ADVISORY COMM. ON BIOTECH. & 21ST CENTURY AGRIC. (AC21), MTG. TRAN-
SCRIPT 17, MAY 29, 2012, at 18 (2012), available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/por-
tal/usda/usdahome?contentid=AC21Main.xml&contentidonly=true.
210. USDA ADVISORY COMM. ON BIOTECH. & 21ST CENTURY AGRIC. (AC21), MEETING
SUMMARY, AUGUST 27-28, 2012, at 5 (2012), available at http://www.usda.gov/
wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=AC21Main.xml.
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ers, advocates, and the agricultural industry monitor the work of the
AC21 closely, as their recommendations could have major ramifica-
tions for the development of national policy addressing coexistence.
At the May 29, 2012 meeting, the committee noted that it had not
yet been able to reach consensus on the first two issues, specifically
because disagreement existed regarding the assumption that a com-
pensation mechanism is necessary.211  In addition, because of the di-
verse interests collaborating in the development of the report for
Secretary Vilsack, the committee determined it would be best to pro-
vide broad guidance in the form of a series of recommendations to the
Secretary so that it could be considered a true consensus report and
alleviate the need for a separate minority report.212  When the Secre-
tary had the opportunity to speak to the group, he strongly en-
couraged them to consider the ways in which they might reach
consensus, suggesting that the United States desperately needs an ag-
ricultural policy that protects all farmers.213  He stated: “[P]lease,
don’t tell me it’s too difficult.  Please don’t tell me that folks are too
locked in.  The vision is to[o] compelling.  And the example is needed
now more than ever.”214  He pleaded with the committee to meet its
charge and provide the catalyst necessary for the USDA to implement
programs.215
In response to a question about the potential for the USDA to
launch a program whereby farmers would be educated about what
farming production methods their neighbors are engaged in to miti-
gate risk, the Secretary noted that it would require a tremendous ef-
fort on the part of the agency but would be a positive step in the right
direction.216  The Secretary also acknowledged the tremendous
amount of uncertainty generated by the risk that currently exists
without a viable set of coexistence strategies.217  In turn, he pushed
the committee to consider how to provide certainty and balance the
responsibilities where the legal system will inevitably fail to do so.218
While some might shrug off the Secretary’s comments about our farm-
ers and food producers forming a community that needs to figure out
211. Id. at 10–11.
212. Id. at 28–30.
213. Id. at 37 (“There’s ways to figure all that stuff out, if you focus on reducing and
mitigating the risk and covering the risk.  And everybody comes to the table and
gives a little bit.  If you could do that, you walk out of this room having met your
responsibility, which is a big deal.  You walk out of this room sending a message
to all of agriculture and all of rural America that there are ways in which reason-
able people can sit around a table and reach some form of consensus and recogni-
tion and understanding.”).
214. Id. at 39.
215. Id. at 43.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 54–55.
218. Id.
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how to best help and protect one another, his statements reflect an
ideology that has been lost in our farming communities and one that
needs to be recaptured.
Regardless of any federal policies that favor biotechnology or fail to
recognize a difference between GE and non-GE crops, the USDA needs
to think more critically about a national agriculture policy that em-
ploys some of the same considerations as those in the EU to provide
the safety and certainty so desperately lacking in our current regula-
tory structure.  To do so, the AC21 needs to meet its charge and pro-
vide real, substantive recommendations that can help guide a national
policy on food production that operates by mitigating risk and distrib-
uting responsibility equitably among the parties.  While some may
question the need for the USDA to receive these recommendations
before taking action on these issues, the agency should be commended
for its approach.  Because this issue has been contentious for so long, a
consensus report submitted by a diverse group of stakeholders that
includes representatives from all interested groups provides a strong
basis for the agency to develop national policy that has the support of
most affected parties.
In May, the AC21 provided a list of “potential framing points” for
the report,219 which was followed by a draft report in August.220  To
the dismay of some, the committee did not reach consensus on the de-
velopment of a compensation mechanism to address economic losses
resulting from the adventitious presence of genetically engineered or-
ganisms due to the perceived lack of data suggesting the need for such
a program.221  It did, however, tentatively agree on crop insurance as
a mechanism should one prove necessary, however, this recommenda-
tion was conditioned on the Secretary evaluating any “economic data”
it has collected regarding “actual economic losses.”222  Moreover, the
committee urged the Secretary to consider the “domestic and global
policy implications, as well as the potential trade/economic implica-
tions.”223  In addition, the committee agreed that an agency created
education initiative and mitigation strategy is necessary to address
the risks posed by adventitious presence.224  One of the points in-
219. USDA ADVISORY COMM. ON BIOTECH. & 21ST CENTURY AGRIC. (AC21), POTENTIAL
FRAMING POINTS/THEMES FOR THE AC21 REPORT (2012), available at http://www.
usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=AC21Main.xml&contentidonly=
true.
220. Id. at 24–47.
221. Id. at 29.
222. Id. at 33–34.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 38–39 (“[T]his effort should highlight the need for good on-farm production
practices, strategies for neighborly farmer- to-farmer collaboration, the value of
private marketing contracts, and the risks and responsibilities associated with
meeting private contractual agreements for IP production. . . .  It should seek to
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cluded in the executive summary, in particular, provides the neces-
sary beginnings for a USDA sponsored program directed towards
helping farmers achieve coexistence.  Specifically, the committee rec-
ognized the need for farmers to have ongoing discussions about coexis-
tence at the local level.225  And, where appropriate, the committee
urged farmers to create “coexistence zones or other local mechanisms
to support farmer preferences and strengthen communities.”226
In its final report, submitted on November 19, 2012,227 the com-
mittee reiterated its position that the members were unable to agree
on a compensation mechanism due to the perceived difficulties in
“identifying and quantifying actual losses to farmers resulting from
unintended presence of GE material in their crops.”228  Because of this
fundamental disagreement, the committee acknowledged that a com-
pensation mechanism viewed as “placing unfair burdens” on a specific
sector would only serve to further create divisions within agricul-
ture.229  On the other hand, most members of the committee were in
agreement that a compensation mechanism would likely reduce the
potential for farmers to sue other farmers due to crop contamination,
but would probably have little or no effect on prospective litigation
challenging the USDA’s approaches to regulating GE crops.230  In con-
sidering the different alternatives, the committee was clear that the
USDA should refrain from regulating in a manner that suggests it
believes legally developed GE products are, in any way, unsafe.231
Ultimately, the committee echoed its earlier recommendations and
urged the USDA to evaluate data on actual economic losses and, if
warranted, develop a compensation mechanism based on a crop insur-
ance model and implement it as a pilot project that “would include
incentives for the development of joint coexistence plans by neighbor-
ing farmers.”232  In addition, the committee recommended the agency
give special consideration to the “potential inequities” placed on farm-
ers who grow GE crops because of the premiums they pay for such
products.233  To that end, the recommendations suggest that farmers
growing GE crops should have the option to purchase insurance, but
promote local, voluntary solutions and accommodate local and regional diversity
in agriculture and should be mindful of the range of farmer production needs.”)
225. Id.
226. Id. at 38.
227. AC21 ENHANCING COEXISTENCE: A REPORT OF THE AC21 TO THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE (2012), available at http://www.usda.gov/documents/ac21_report-
enhancing-coexistence.pdf.
228. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 11.
231. Id. at 12.
232. Id. at 14.
233. Id.
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benefit from reduced premiums if they enter into a joint coexistence
agreement with their neighbors.234
Beyond compensation, the committee restated many of the points
it made in earlier drafts, urging the agency to work with diverse
groups of stakeholders,235 to provide incentives for “neighborly
farmer-to-farmer collaboration” and help educate farmers about dif-
ferent agricultural methods of production to work toward meaningful
coexistence.236 Perhaps these measures appear insignificant, but
when considered in the context of our existing federal policies towards
agricultural biotechnology and the burdens they place on farmers who
choose not to use it, the creation of a new national policy that begins to
allocate responsibility among farmers in a more equitable manner
represents substantial innovation. To this point, the agency has yet to
take a position that imposes any responsibility on farmers planting
GE crops, yet the recommendations from the committee take into ac-
count the need for balance. It has yet to be determined what the final
outcome of these measures will be, and whether they will, in fact,
translate to a new national policy on coexistence.  But, the very fact
that members of these different sectors were able to come together
and talk about issues that have been contentious for decades while
reaching consensus on the fundamental principle that all farmers
could benefit by having more knowledge about one another’s produc-
tion methods and should adopt measures to minimize their neighbor’s
losses evidences substantial progress.  Ultimately, the outcome will
likely not be acceptable to everyone, but it does represent the first
steps toward meaningful agreement about farmer coexistence.
234. Id.
235. Specifically, the agency suggested collaboration between “technology producers,
seed companies, commodity and farmers’ organizations, agricultural trade and
marketing companies and organizations, education and extension services, public
organizations, and State and local governments.” Id. at 19.
236. Id.
